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NOTE 
THE MISSING ALGORITHM: SAFEGUARDING BRADY 
AGAINST THE RISE OF TRADE SECRECY IN POLICING 
Deborah Won* 
Trade secrecy, a form of intellectual property protection, serves the important 
societal function of promoting innovation. But as police departments across 
the country increasingly rely on proprietary technologies like facial recognition 
and predictive policing tools, an uneasy tension between due process and trade 
secrecy has developed: to fulfill Brady’s constitutional promise of a fair trial, 
defendants must have access to the technologies accusing them, access that 
trade secrecy inhibits. Thus far, this tension is being resolved too far in favor 
of the trade secret holder—and at too great an expense to the defendant. The 
wrong balance has been struck. 
This Note offers three contributions. First, it explains the use of algorithms in 
law enforcement and the intertwined role of trade secrecy protections. Second, 
it shows how trade secrecy clashes with the Due Process Clause—the Constitu-
tion’s mechanism for correcting the power asymmetry between the state and the 
defendant—and argues that due process should not waver simply because a 
source of evidence is digital, not human. Third, it proposes a solution that better 
balances a defendant’s due process rights with intellectual property protections. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Algorithmic policing is on the rise. Investigative tools like facial recogni-
tion, DNA genotyping, and predictive policing systems are increasingly—and 
effectively—being marketed by private technology companies as the best way 
to police efficiently under tight budget constraints.1 But because algorithmic 
systems are built by humans, they exhibit human fallibilities, including racial 
and gender bias, inconsistency, and error.2 Despite their similarities, algorith-
mic systems and humans are treated differently when used against a criminal 
defendant in court. Humans are subject to adversarial scrutiny; algorithmic 
systems are not.3 The difference is attributable to trade secrecy, a form of in-
tellectual property protection designed to maintain “standards of commercial 
 
 1. See, e.g., Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?, NIJ J., 
June 2010, at 16, 17 (noting one police chief’s belief that predictive policing was “the perfect tool 
to help departments become more efficient as budgets continue to be reduced”); Ellen Huet, 
Server and Protect: Predictive Policing Firm PredPol Promises to Map Crime Before It Happens, 
FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/02/11/predpol-
predictive-policing [perma.cc/7WNJ-KS2A] (“It’s impossible to know if PredPol prevents crime, 
since crime rates fluctuate, or to know the details of the software’s black-box algorithm, but 
budget-strapped police chiefs don’t care.”). 
 2. Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Kate Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: 
How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 31–33 (2019). 
 3. See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1992 (2017). For example, 
human witnesses are subject to cross-examination and information about their credibility—or 
lack thereof—must be shared with the defendant. Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 57 (D.C. 
2006). Algorithms that serve similar testimonial functions, however, are shielded from inspec-
tion. Compare Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a Brady violation 
where prosecutor failed to disclose evidence about a human eyewitness’s “positive identification 
of different suspects”), with Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166, 1169–70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) 
October 2021] Safeguarding Brady Against Trade Secrecy 159 
ethics” and “encourage[] invention.”4 When invoked in the criminal context, 
however, trade secrecy shields algorithmic systems from adversarial scrutiny—
even when the Constitution mandates it.5 
It is perplexing that algorithmic systems receive heightened protection as 
intellectual property given that defendants’ due process rights do not change 
simply because the investigatory source is digital, not human. This is particu-
larly troubling given the government’s affirmative duty under Brady v. Mary-
land to disclose helpful evidence to the criminal defendant.6 The Brady 
obligation, established by the Supreme Court to ensure that the defendant re-
ceives a full and fair trial under the Due Process Clause, requires that the pros-
ecutor turn over any information “favorable” to the defendant that is in the 
prosecutor’s constructive “possession,” so long as that evidence is “material” 
to the defendant’s case.7 Favorable information includes both impeachment8 
and exculpatory9 evidence. The prosecutor must actively search for favorable 
evidence not just in their own possession, but also in the possession of any 
member of the “prosecution team.”10 The prosecutor’s duty to search and dis-
close is “ongoing.”11 
However, prosecutors need only disclose favorable evidence that is “ma-
terial.” The standard for determining materiality may differ depending on 
whether a prosecutor’s Brady compliance is evaluated before or after the trial’s 
conclusion. The post-trial materiality standard is well established. A defend-
ant that raises a Brady challenge after trial must show prejudice—that there is 
a “reasonable probability” disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in a 
 
(declining to find a Brady violation where the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence about an 
algorithmic witness’s identification of different possible matches). 
 4. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974). 
 5. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987). 
 8. Impeachment evidence includes information that would cast doubt on the prosecu-
tion’s witnesses or expose cracks in its case. Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression 
of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 425 (2010). 
 9. Exculpatory evidence includes evidence that tends to negate guilt, reduce culpability, 
support an affirmative defense, or potentially reduce the severity of a sentence. Id. at 423–24. 
 10. An individual or entity is a part of the “prosecution team” if their role in the case was 
to assist the prosecution, evaluated based on “what the person did, not who the person is.” 
United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). The prosecution 
team, for example, may include law enforcement, crime labs, and expert witnesses. Youngblood 
v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 870 (2006); In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 719–20 (Cal. 1998); see 
State v. Farris, 656 S.E.2d 121, 128–29 (W. Va. 2007). 
 11. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60 (“[T]he duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be 
deemed immaterial upon original examination may become important as the proceedings pro-
gress.”). 
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different verdict.12 The pretrial materiality standard, however, lacks uni-
formity. Some courts have imported the post-trial prejudice requirement into 
the pretrial standard, while others have rejected it and require only that the 
evidence be favorable.13 Those courts with a mirrored pretrial standard there-
fore allow prosecutors to determine whether evidence is Brady material based 
on their own predictions of the eventual trial’s outcome. The pretrial prejudice 
requirement thus makes it easy for prosecutors to manipulate Brady’s materi-
ality threshold; prosecutors can cobble together any number of arguments 
that disclosing evidence would not affect the ultimate verdict. Thus, to main-
tain the central tenet of Brady—that defendants be treated fairly as they face 
the machinery of the state—defendants should not be required to show prej-
udice before trial to obtain favorable evidence.14 
This Note argues that for purposes of Brady disclosures, courts should 
view law enforcement algorithms as analogous to human witnesses and 
should accordingly implement an at-trial “missing algorithm” remedy when 
trade secrecy is invoked. Part I provides the factual and legal background of 
law enforcement algorithms and trade secrecy protections to place the ques-
tion in context. Part II analyzes Brady and its progeny and concludes that al-
gorithmic information falls within a prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable 
material to the defendant. Part III proposes that courts adopt a missing algo-
rithm rule, allowing juries to draw reasonable and limited inferences to safe-
guard defendants’ due process rights when their access is limited by 
intellectual property protections. 
I. LAW ENFORCEMENT ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS AND TRADE SECRECY 
Machine-learning algorithms are increasingly executing government 
functions. One context in which algorithmic systems are proliferating is law 
enforcement and prosecution.15 As public attention to automated deci-
sionmaking has increased, terms like “algorithm,” “machine learning,” and 
 
 12. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that exculpatory evidence 
is not “material” unless there is a “reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding 
would have been different” had the evidence been disclosed). 
 13. Compare United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198–99 (C.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“This [materiality] standard is only appropriate, and thus applicable, in the context of appellate 
review. Whether disclosure would have influenced the outcome of a trial can only be determined 
after the trial is completed and the total effect of all the inculpatory evidence can be weighed 
against the presumed effect of the undisclosed Brady material.”), with Boyd v. United States, 908 
A.2d 39, 59 (D.C. 2006) (interpreting Bagley and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), to 
require a pretrial “materiality,” not “favorable,” standard). 
 14. For a more comprehensive discussion and argument that courts should reject a pre-
trial prejudice requirement, see Jones, supra note 8. 
 15. For example, from 2010 through 2016, over 2,800 arrests were made as a result of 
facial recognition technology. In 2018 alone, facial recognition was used as an investigative tool 
in over 8,000 cases. Julie Bosman & Serge F. Kovaleski, Facial Recognition: Dawn of Dystopia, or 
Just the New Fingerprint?, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/us/fa-
cial-recognition-police.html [perma.cc/HU83-Z65H]. 
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“predictive policing” have become buzzwords, often used loosely and inter-
changeably.16 Section I.A provides definitions of those terms and a high-level 
explanation of how an “algorithmic system” works. Section I.B summarizes 
U.S. trade secrecy law and explains which components of an algorithmic sys-
tem can be shielded under trade secret protections. 
A. What Are Algorithmic Systems? 
To understand what a law enforcement algorithmic system is, it is neces-
sary to first unpack what an algorithmic system is. An algorithmic system in-
volves several separate technical components. As the term suggests, the 
foundation of the system is the “algorithm,” a specified series of logical steps 
used to accomplish some task.17 The algorithm is operationalized by source 
code. Source code is a series of letters, numbers, and punctuation that give the 
computer instructions on how to act in accordance with the algorithm.18 Sys-
tems vary greatly in how many lines of source code they contain. 
A “machine-learning” algorithm is an algorithm that is “taught” on train-
ing data to perceive patterns and to subsequently become better at discerning 
new patterns when exposed to new information.19 Training data is a collection 
of examples from which the algorithm is instructed to extract logical rules.20 
“Verification” and “test” data sets are then used to score and refine the perfor-
mance of the algorithm.21 
In addition, an algorithmic system requires inputs to produce a desired 
output. The input is the information fed into the algorithm, and the output is 
the information created by applying the algorithm to the input data—for ex-
ample, whether a person’s picture has a match in a facial recognition database. 
Though every algorithmic system requires some kind of input and produces 
an output, they vary widely depending on the purpose or design of the system 
and can also vary over time.22 
These technical components—the algorithm, training data, input, and 
output—are limited by policy decisions implemented by the designer or the 
 
 16. See AI NOW INST., ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY TOOLKIT 2–3 (2018), 
https://ainowinstitute.org/aap-toolkit.pdf [perma.cc/X2C6-FPD7]. 
 17. AARON RIEKE, MIRANDA BOGEN & DAVID G. ROBINSON, UPTURN, PUBLIC SCRUTINY 
OF AUTOMATED DECISIONS 9 (2018), https://omidyar.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Pub-
lic-Scrutiny-of-Automated-Decisions.pdf [perma.cc/9A9K-JKBN]. 
 18. Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1183, 
1193–94 (2019). 
 19. Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 881 (2016) (providing a general definition of “machine 
learning” but noting the inconsistent usage of the phrase); SOLON BAROCAS ET AL., DATA & CIVIL 
RIGHTS: TECHNOLOGY PRIMER 4 (2014), https://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2014-1030/Tech-
nology.pdf [perma.cc/NNS7-FS4C]. 
 20. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 12; BAROCAS ET AL., supra note 19, at 4. 
 21. Rich, supra note 19, at 882. 
 22. See id. at 921; RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 11. 
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user.23 Indeed, policies, which are the result of human choices, “govern how 
both technical and human components of th[e] system should behave.”24 
These policy limits might take the form of certain prohibitions built into the 
algorithm, or they might instruct the user on how to act upon or interpret an 
algorithm’s output.25 
A “law enforcement algorithmic system,” as used in this Note, is an algo-
rithmic system that is used by government entities like police departments for 
surveillance, investigation, or prosecution purposes.26 One increasingly com-
mon example of a law enforcement algorithmic system is facial recognition 
technology.27 A facial recognition algorithm, broadly speaking, is trained to 
identify faces by analyzing images in a historical dataset.28 A police officer or 
analyst can then input an image into the algorithm.29 The output is a series of 
similar photos, usually with a probability ranking to denote the likelihood of 
a “match.”30 Depending on the policies in place, the police officer may or may 
not act upon the similar photos by finding and detaining any identified indi-
viduals. 
Each technical component of an algorithmic system involves human 
judgment. The sequential logical steps embodied by the algorithm and opera-
tionalized by the source code are written and designed by humans.31 The 
training data is selected by humans. The input is chosen and the output is in-
terpreted by humans. Thus, each component risks human error and human 
bias.32 
For example, the historical datasets on which facial recognition and other 
machine-learning algorithms are trained are often skewed by race and gen-
der.33 One dataset, deemed the “gold standard benchmark for face recogni-
tion,” was found to be approximately 83.5 percent white and 77.5 percent 
 
 23. See RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 11. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. While there are law enforcement algorithmic systems that are not “machine learning,” 
this Note focuses on machine-learning systems because they are at the forefront of criminal-
justice-technology innovation—the inventions most likely to be declared as trade secrets by de-
velopers. However, the thesis and proposed solution of this Note applies to both machine-learn-
ing and non-machine-learning technologies alike. 
 27. Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. CTR. 
ON PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com [perma.cc/S5EY-2X58]. 
 28. Amici Curiae Brief of ACLU et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, Lynch v. State, No. 
SC2019-298 (Fla. July 19, 2019) [hereinafter Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief], https://www.aclu.org
/sites/default/files/field_document/florida_face_recognition_amici_brief.pdf [perma.cc/Y97V-
LGEY]. 
 29. Garvie, supra note 27. 
 30. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 11. 
 31. See infra Part II. 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. See Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 18–20; see also A.R. LANGE, CTR. FOR 
DEMOCRACY & TECH., DIGITAL DECISIONS: POLICY TOOLS IN AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING 
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male.34 Unsurprisingly, researchers have found that algorithmic systems are 
one hundred times more likely to misidentify African and Asian Americans 
than white individuals,35 and are also more likely to misidentify women than 
men.36 Illustrating this problem, one study tested Rekognition, Amazon’s fa-
cial recognition tool, and found that it incorrectly identified twenty-eight 
members of Congress as people from a criminal database.37 Nonwhite mem-
bers of Congress were disproportionately misidentified, at about 40 percent of 
false positives, despite making up only about 20 percent of Congress. That 
false positives are much higher for racial minorities is particularly concerning 
given that minorities are also more likely to be subjected to facial recognition 
searches for law enforcement purposes.38 
Training data may also be racially skewed because of past discriminatory 
police practices. When Black men are disproportionately targeted and ar-
rested by police for drug crimes, or when predominantly Black neighborhoods 
are disproportionately targeted for unjustified police scrutiny and intrusion—
to list just a few of the multitude of examples—those racially biased arrests 
and police contacts create skewed historical data in which Black men are 




 34. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities 
in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77, 77, 79 (2018). 
 35. Drew Harwell, Federal Study Confirms Racial Bias of Many Facial-Recognition Sys-
tems, Casts Doubt on Their Expanding Use, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019, 6:43 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/19/federal-study-confirms-racial-bias-
many-facial-recognition-systems-casts-doubt-their-expanding-use [perma.cc/WWL9-FEM7]. 
 36. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 34, at 2–3. 
 37. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with 
Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/sur-
veillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28 [perma.cc/X7QE-Z44N]. 
 38. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 34, at 2. In a “striking change” for the prominent 
supplier of law enforcement technologies, Amazon announced in 2020 that it was placing a tem-
porary, one-year moratorium on the use of Rekognition. The announcement came on the heels 
of nationwide protest over racism and biased policing and after two years of advocacy by the 
ACLU to stop Amazon from selling the technology to law enforcement. Karen Weise & Natasha 
Singer, Amazon Pauses Police Use of Its Facial Recognition Software, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html 
[perma.cc/KVJ5-E42C]. 
 39. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 41–46. In addition to the examples discussed, there 
are many other ways in which training data may be skewed. For example, certain types of crimes, 
like property theft, may be overrepresented because other types, like white-collar crime, are un-
derenforced or underreported. Id. at 41–42, 41 n.119. Concern about flawed training data has 
likewise been raised in a variety of contexts outside of policing. E.g., Rachel Goodman, Why 
Amazon’s Automated Hiring Tool Discriminated Against Women, ACLU (Oct. 12, 2018, 1:00 
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/why-amazons-au-
tomated-hiring-tool-discriminated-against [perma.cc/VB6H-MZEY] (describing employee hir-
ing algorithm that consistently scored women as less successful job candidates than men due to 
skewed training data); Angela Lashbrook, AI-Driven Dermatology Could Leave Dark-Skinned 
Patients Behind, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018
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greater criminality, may reinforce the biases underlying the discriminatory 
practices and produce a flawed, circular justification for increasing the polic-
ing of already overpoliced communities.40 Then, when that biased historical 
data is used to train algorithms, the discrimination becomes “baked in” and 
can perpetuate and exacerbate the bias—a “garbage in, garbage out” prob-
lem.41 
For instance, in 2012 Chicago deployed the Strategic Subject List (SSL), 
an algorithmic tool that ranked individuals at risk of becoming either victims 
or offenders in a shooting or homicide.42 The tool assigned individuals a risk 
tier, ranging from “very low” to “very high,” but did not differentiate between 
potential “victims” and “offenders.”43 The tool was problematic not only be-
cause it weighed arrests rather than convictions as a factor—meaning that the 
list likely reflected the Chicago Police Department’s discriminatory practices 
of targeting nonwhite individuals and communities—44 but also because the 
factor that most affected a person’s risk score was age.45 Indeed, 56 percent of 
all Black men under thirty in Chicago were listed and assigned risk scores by 
the SSL.46 Notably, Black men under thirty were exactly the same demo-
graphic targeted by the Chicago Police Department’s unlawful stop-and-frisk 
practices.47 From these facts, researchers concluded that the tool likely in-
gested racially skewed data.48 
Inclusion on the list had serious consequences—two-thirds of the indi-
viduals on the list were flagged to receive heightened police scrutiny and were 
 
/08/machine-learning-dermatology-skin-color/567619 [perma.cc/H53U-XQCT] (noting that 
skin-cancer diagnostic algorithms risk misdiagnosing patients with darker skin because algo-
rithms are trained primarily on data about white patients). 
 40. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 41–42. 
 41. LANGE, supra note 33, at 4. 
 42. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 31–32. 
 43. Id. at 31. 
 44. Id. at 31 & n.68. 
 45. Because the Chicago Police Department refused to release the algorithm, citing pro-
prietary concerns, researchers worked backwards from an available dataset of scores (obtained 
only after a lengthy legal dispute) to determine how the SSL calculated scores. Jeff Asher & Rob 
Arthur, Inside the Algorithm That Tries to Predict Gun Violence in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/upshot/what-an-algorithm-reveals-about-life-on-
chicagos-high-risk-list.html [perma.cc/KCF2-B8TN]; Brianna Posadas, How Strategic Is Chi-
cago’s “Strategic Subjects List”? Upturn Investigates., MEDIUM (June 22, 2017), https:/medium
.com/equal-future/how-strategic-is-chicagos-strategic-subjects-list-upturn-investigates-
9e5b4b235a7c [perma.cc/Y3HW-H3XY]. Two independent analyses by the New York Times and 
Upturn confirmed that age was the most important factor in SSL’s score assessment. Id. 
 46. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 32. 
 47. These practices were the subject of a 2015 settlement agreement. See Investigatory Stop 
and Protective Pat Down Settlement Agreement, ACLU ILL. 2–8 (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.aclu-
il.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-06-Investigatory-Stop-and-Protec-
tive-Pat-Down-Settlement-Agreeme....pdf [perma.cc/7MEP-FSNC]. 
 48. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 15. 
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more likely to be arrested as a direct result of being included on the list.49 
While it is unclear how officers actually used SSL predictions in the field,50 
one Chicago Police Department directive encouraged “[t]he highest possible 
charges” for all individuals on the list, regardless of their risk score, so long as 
they had received notice about being on the list and were subsequently ar-
rested.51 The SSL is thus a cautionary example of how a tool trained on “dirty 
data” risks “perpetuating additional harm via feedback loops”52—harm laden 
with grave privacy and civil rights implications for those targeted individuals.53 
Furthermore, even a simple “accident” in the source code, such as a mis-
taken ampersand, can result in substantive differences.54 One study found that 
33 percent of “highly experienced” programmers failed to properly use paren-
theses, which in complex programs could result in “tens of thousands of er-
rors.”55 For example, source code errors in STRmix, a probabilistic DNA 
genotyping program,56 produced incorrect results—stating a percentage like-
lihood that the defendant’s DNA matched a sample at the crime scene when 
that percentage was off by a factor of ten—in sixty criminal cases.57 Prosecu-
tors were forced to replace twenty-four expert statements after that coding-
 
 49. Id. at 31 n.65, 32; see also Jessica Saunders, Priscilla Hunt & John S. Hollywood, Pre-
dictions Put Into Practice: A Quasi-experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 
12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 366–67 (2016). 
 50. Posadas, supra note 45; see also Saunders et al., supra note 49, at 347 (“One potential 
reason why being placed on the list resulted in an increased chance of being arrested for a shoot-
ing is that some officers may have used the list as leads to closing shooting cases.”). 
 51. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 32–33. 
 52. Id. at 15. 
 53. After eight years of employing the SSL, the Chicago Police Department quietly de-
commissioned the tool in early 2020 following an investigation by the Office of the Inspector 
General. Kathleen Foody, Chicago Police End Effort to Predict Gun Offenders, Victims, AP NEWS 
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/41f75b783d796b80815609e737211cc6 [perma.cc
/X2EL-T5DU]. While the SSL is now out of commission, the Chicago Police Department plans 
to deploy other predictive policing tools in the future. Advisory Concerning the Chicago Police 
Department’s Predictive Risk Models, CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://igchicago.org/2020/01/23/advisory-concerning-the-chicago-police-departments-pre-
dictive-risk-models [perma.cc/MCF6-RCWB]. 
 54. Christian Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants, 
and the Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 186–95 (2017). 
 55. Id. at 186–87. 
 56. Probabilistic DNA genotyping programs use algorithms to analyze “complex” DNA 
mixtures, samples which contain the DNA of multiple unknown individuals. In contrast to the 
analysis of “simple” DNA samples (involving the DNA of just one or perhaps two persons), 
complex-mixture analysis involves subjective interpretation and thus does not produce objective 
results, nor has it been thoroughly tested for reliability. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON 
SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: 
ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 7–8 (2016); PRESIDENT’S 
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, AN ADDENDUM TO THE 
PCAST REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS 8 (2017). 
 57. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1244; Amicus Curiae Brief of Elec. Frontier Found. in Sup-
port of Defendant & Appellant Billy Ray Johnson at 13, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 11, 2019), 2017 WL 10320827, at *13 [hereinafter Johnson EFF Amicus Brief]; Brief 
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error discovery.58 In one New York trial involving a different DNA genotyp-
ing program, the judge granted the defense access to the program despite the 
government’s objections to access on “proprietary” grounds.59 Review of the 
source code uncovered that the program had dropped essential data from its 
calculations in ways that would have unpredictably changed the program’s 
DNA probability results.60 Once the defense expert witness testified to that 
effect, the prosecution withdrew the DNA evidence against the defendant.61 
Additionally, inputs are selected by humans, who may feed nonsensical 
data to the algorithm.62 Yet another variation of the garbage in, garbage out 
problem, such inputs would only produce nonsensical outputs.63 For example, 
when the New York Police Department (NYPD) was investigating a beer theft, 
it first fed the facial recognition tool a store surveillance image of the actual 
culprit.64 But when that input produced no match, NYPD decided to input an 
image of celebrity Woody Harrelson because one officer remarked that the 
culprit resembled a Woody Harrelson with long hair.65 Based on the Woody 
Harrelson “matches,” the police arrested the defendant (who was not Woody 
Harrelson).66 While NYPD declined to admit what happened to the non-
Woody Harrelson after the arrest,67 the incident illustrates how prone to hu-
man error, and thus how fallible, algorithms can be. In addition to celebrity 
images, records show that police departments use other concerning inputs 
such as artist sketches and graphically modified images.68 
Similarly, outputs may also be selectively chosen by humans in problem-
atic ways. For example, Willie Lynch was convicted in Florida for selling fifty 
 
of Amici Curiae ACLU & ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Cntys. in Support of Real Party in Int. 
Seeking Dismissal at 25, People v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71 (Ct. App. 2018) [hereinafter 
Superior Court ACLU Amicus Brief]. 
 58. Superior Court ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 57, at 25. 
 59. Lauren Kirchner, Traces of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-evi-
dence-new-york-disputed-techniques.html [perma.cc/KD4R-Q4S8]. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. While a specific input is not itself a trade secret, the user manuals that may tell police 
officers what inputs should or should not be used may be claimed as a trade secret to prevent 
defendants from reviewing them. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellec-
tual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1367 (2018) (“Police depart-
ments have cited trade secrets as reason to deny open records requests for face recognition user 
manuals and audit information.”). 
 63. Garvie, supra note 27. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Bosman & Kovaleski, supra note 15 (“The New York Police Department declined to 
say whether the [Woody Harrelson “match”] had been convicted, but defended its use of [facial 
recognition] technology, saying that . . . [it] had led to arrests in homicides, rapes and robberies 
and had even helped identify a woman with Alzheimer’s.”). 
 68. Garvie, supra note 27. 
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dollars’ worth of drugs based on a facial recognition database called Face 
Analysis Comparison Examination System (FACES).69 During a drug sale, po-
lice officers surreptitiously photographed the seller with a cell phone camera. 
The photos were blurry in places and taken at an oblique angle.70 The officers, 
not knowing who the individual was, did not make an arrest on the scene.71 
Instead, they sent the cell phone photos to an analyst.72 That analyst fed the 
low-quality photos into FACES, which produced five possible African Amer-
ican suspects, including Lynch.73 FACES only designated Lynch at a one-star 
level of confidence—the lowest number of stars for “likelihood” that the 
match was accurate.74 Despite the low rating, the analyst selected Lynch and 
submitted his identification information to the officers. No other matches 
were submitted. The officers promptly arrested Lynch. At trial, Lynch raised 
just one defense—that he was mistakenly identified as the seller.75 Lynch was 
convicted, and on appeal he asked to see the other matches produced by 
FACES because it would help his defense.76 The Florida appeals court denied 
Lynch’s request. The court reasoned that because Lynch could not show that 
the other algorithm-produced matches resembled him, he could not show that 
access to those photos would support his argument that he was mistakenly 
identified.77 Of course, the court did not address how Lynch would have been 
able to show that those photos resembled him without any access to the photos 
in the first place.78 Willie Lynch was sentenced to eight years of incarceration 
and is currently in prison. 
This Section has shown that the potential for error—the same flaws, bi-
ases, and lapses in judgment that humans exhibit—is embedded in every com-
ponent of algorithmic systems. However, while that commonality would urge 
the same scrutiny for both human and algorithmic error in criminal cases, 
trade secrecy shrouds the latter. 
 
 69. Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166, 1168–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018). 
 70. Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 2. 
 71. Id. at 2–3. 
 72. Lynch, 260 So. 3d at 1169. 
 73. Aaron Mak, Facing Facts, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Jan. 25, 2019, 12:49 PM), 
https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/facial-recognition-arrest-transparency-willie-allen-
lynch.html [perma.cc/7DSC-D5NW]. 
 74. Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 14. 
 75. Id. at 1. 
 76. Mak, supra note 73. 
 77. Lynch, 260 So. 3d at 1170. 
 78. Further, as Lynch’s public defender stated in his motion for rehearing, it “strains cre-
dulity” to say that none of the other potential matches resembled Lynch. Motion for Rehearing 
& Written Op. at 2, Lynch, 260 So. 3d. 1166 (No. 1D16-3290). 
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B. What Are Trade Secrets and What Can They Shield from Disclosure? 
There are four forms of intellectual property: copyright, patents, trade-
marks, and trade secrets.79 One central purpose of intellectual property pro-
tection is to promote innovation by ensuring the creator has the financial 
incentives to innovate given the significant investment of resources required 
to do so.80 All four forms of intellectual property thus provide some legal 
mechanism that protects the innovator’s ability to reap the financial benefits 
of their investment.81 
Trade secrecy’s mechanism targets misappropriation: the improper use, 
acquisition, or disclosure of a trade secret.82 A trade secret designation offers 
“powerful legal protections to companies that want to keep their business 
practices a secret.”83 Trade secret holders receive two types of protection. First, 
substantive trade secret protection allows proprietors to recover monetary 
damages for trade secret misappropriation and to secure injunctive relief 
against future misappropriation.84 Second, evidentiary trade secret protection 
allows proprietors to shield their trade secret when in court, preventing busi-
ness competitors from exploiting court proceedings to obtain commercially 
valuable information.85 
Trade secrets are the youngest and least restrained form of intellectual 
property protection.86 For example, while patent protection requires one to 
undergo a formal application and approval process and has a set expiration 
 
 79. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 311, 315 (2008). Intellectual property is defined as, broadly speaking, “creations of 
the mind.” WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WHAT IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 1 (2020), 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_450_2020.pdf [perma.cc/BLP3-K2GR]. 
 80. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 79, at 2; see also Lemley, supra note 79, at 
329–30; Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 262 (1998) (explaining that the “incentives to create” justification is “well-
established as the principal economic justification for intellectual property rights in general” and 
is the “most frequently invoked” justification for trade secrecy). 
 81. Lemley, supra note 79, at 329–30; Bone, supra note 80, at 262–63. 
 82. Jessica M. Meyers, Artificial Intelligence and Trade Secrets, LANDSLIDE, Jan./Feb. 2019, 
at 17, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/land-
slide/2018-19/january-february/artificial-intelligence-trade-secrets-webinar [perma.cc/D9VY-
9X4L]. In contrast, other forms of intellectual property like patents and copyright provide pro-
prietors with a monopoly over the property’s use. Id. 
 83. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Auto-
mated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014). 
 84. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1382. 
 85. Id. at 1382–83. 
 86. See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1095 (2012). 
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date,87 trade secret protection requires no formal process and can extend in-
definitely.88 There is no uniform definition of trade secrets, but they are gen-
erally described as “confidential, commercially valuable information.”89 To 
procure protection, the purported trade secret needs to meet just two require-
ments: (1) it derives independent economic value from being generally not 
known and (2) reasonable efforts have been made by the trade secret holder 
to maintain its secrecy.90 
The trade secret evidentiary privilege raises the defendant’s burden for 
discovery. When it is invoked, the defendant must make a “particularized 
showing” that what they seek is “necessary to the defense.”91 If the defendant 
cannot show necessity, then the proprietor can shield the algorithmic infor-
mation entirely; the defendant is not allowed access even with a protective or-
der.92 
Thus, trade secrecy can be invoked to shield algorithmic systems from 
scrutiny at all stages of a case or proceeding.93 Specifically, the algorithm and 
source code, training data, user manuals, and audit information can be 
claimed as proprietary under the expansive definition of trade secrets.94 Law 
enforcement technology proprietors and prosecutors have already begun to 
invoke trade secrecy to avoid disclosure and scrutiny of their algorithmic sys-
tems.95 
The invocation of trade secrecy to shield law enforcement algorithmic 
systems is likely to increase. In 2014, the Supreme Court made it more difficult 
 
 87. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 88. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (explaining that 
an inventor “may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely”). 
 89. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS: 
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 2 (2016). 
 90. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985). 
 91. People v. Superior Ct. (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 9, 2015). While the California evidence code does not expressly require a showing of partic-
ularity or necessity, the court of appeals in Chubbs read those requirements into the statutory 
text. See Wexler, supra note 62, at 1352 & n.39. Chubbs “is now being cited . . . across the coun-
try,” and other state courts are adopting a similar interpretation. Id. at 1360–61 (collecting cases). 
 92. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1359. 
 93. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) (providing that “[t]he rules on privilege,” including trade 
secret privilege, “apply to all stages of a case or proceeding.”). 
 94. E.g., Wexler, supra note 62, at 1367, 1370. 
 95. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 83, at 5 (explaining that vendors selling technology 
have fought to ensure that their algorithms are “shrouded in secrecy,” often by invoking trade 
secret protections); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology 
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 23–26 (2017) (noting that vendors will also 
often require nondisclosure agreements from their public agency customers); Wexler, supra note 
62, at 1360 & n.71 (reviewing cases where prosecutors and developers have cited Chubbs to jus-
tify withholding trade secret information). 
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to patent software in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,96 thereby encour-
aging developers to use trade secrecy rather than patents to protect their in-
tellectual property.97 And in 2016, Congress established the first federal cause 
of action for trade secret misappropriation by passing the Defend Trade Se-
crets Act.98 The availability of a federal cause of action enables proprietors to 
more easily and efficiently pursue out-of-state and out-of-country infringers, 
making trade secrecy an appealing choice.99 
Additionally, state courts are increasingly adopting a criminal trade secret 
evidentiary privilege.100 At least twenty-one states have a codified trade secret 
privilege in their evidence code, and many states recognize a common law 
privilege.101 While the trade secret privilege was often invoked in civil cases, it 
was not until 2015 that the evidentiary privilege was first extended to a crim-
inal case.102 Since that first case, courts across the country are beginning to 
expressly allow the privilege to withhold evidence from defendants.103 Indeed, 
in a span of just five years, from 2013 to 2018, courts in no fewer than five 
states denied access to algorithmic information due to trade secrecy.104 These 
developments, alongside the lack of any formal claim requirements or expira-
tion date,105 heavily incentivize algorithm developers to rely more on trade 
secret protections than on other branches of intellectual property.106 
Because evidentiary privileges “apply to all stages of a case or proceed-
ing,”107 trade secrecy protections can be invoked before trial, at trial, and after 
trial.108 Before trial, proprietors can invoke the privilege against defendants 
 
 96. 573 U.S. 208 (2014). 
 97. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1214 (“[T]he uncertainty of patent protection, especially in a 
post-Alice world, can push inventors toward the rational belief that the code is much more val-
uable as a secret than as a patented invention.”). 
 98. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2, 130 Stat. 376, 376–82 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836). 
 99. Meyers, supra note 82 (noting that before the Defend Trade Secrets Act, trade secrets 
lagged behind the other three forms of intellectual property, which were all covered by federal 
statute). 
 100. See Wexler, supra note 62, at 1350. 
 101. The states that have codified a trade secret privilege include Alabama, Alaska, Arkan-
sas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Wisconsin. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1352 & n.39. 
 102. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1358–59. 
 103. Id. at 1361–62, 1361 n.80. 
 104. Id. at 1362 n.80 (California, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington). Some 
courts have denied access based expressly on a trade secret privilege, while others have instead 
incorporated the evidence’s trade secret status into their evaluations of defendants’ requests for 
access. Id. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88. 
 106. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1350; see Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–
26 (2014). 
 107. FED. R. EVID. 1101(c). 
 108. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1357. 
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seeking information about the algorithmic systems used in the law enforce-
ment investigation—information that the defendant could have used in sup-
pression hearings.109 At trial, the proprietor (or the prosecutor on behalf of 
the proprietor) can invoke the privilege to shield an algorithmic system used 
as evidence.110 After trial, the proprietor can invoke the privilege in bail or 
sentencing proceedings if the defendant seeks access to a risk-assessment al-
gorithmic tool.111 In addition, proprietors may invoke the privilege if a con-
victed defendant seeks an appeal.112 
Law enforcement algorithmic tools are increasingly being used across the 
country. Surveillance technology companies like Palantir and PredPol that 
market to government entities and police departments claim that their ma-
chine-learning technology is the best way to efficiently police under tight 
budget constraints.113 Thus, products like facial recognition technology have 
proliferated. For example, from 2010 through 2016, facial recognition tech-
nology resulted in approximately 2,800 arrests.114 In 2018 alone, over 8,000 
cases used facial recognition as an investigative tool.115 And companies are 
developing new uses and new tools to capture the lucrative law enforcement 
market.116 Because law enforcement algorithmic tools are becoming more 
prevalent and the incentives for proprietors to choose trade secrecy over other 
intellectual property protections are increasing, courts will have to grapple 
more and more with the invocation of trade secrets in criminal proceedings. 
 
 109. Id. at 1365. 
 110. People v. Superior Ct. (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Jan. 9, 2015). 
 111. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1368–70. 
 112. E.g., People v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 113. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 114. Bosman & Kovaleski, supra note 15. 
 115. Id. However, some municipalities have recently moved to ban facial recognition tools. 
E.g., Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition 
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recog-
nition-ban-san-francisco.html [perma.cc/D7PD-NYEN]; Ally Jarmanning, Boston Lawmakers 




 116. Drew Harwell, Facial Recognition May Be Coming to a Police Body Camera Near You, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2018/04/26/facial-recognition-may-be-coming-to-a-police-body-camera-near-you 
[perma.cc/B5DP-DT25] (facial recognition tools incorporated into body cameras); Maura Do-
lan, ‘Rapid DNA’ Promises Breakthroughs in Solving Crimes. So Why Does It Face a Backlash?, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-
24/rapid-dna-forensics-crime-police [perma.cc/6JSV-SZST] (rapid complex DNA tests). 
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II. WHEN DUE PROCESS AND TRADE SECRETS CLASH 
Trade secrets can be invoked to shield from disclosure significant parts of 
a law enforcement algorithmic tool, including the algorithm, the implement-
ing source code, and the training data (collectively shorthanded here as “algo-
rithmic information”). In the criminal context, trade secrecy protections allow 
law enforcement and prosecutors to shirk their Brady disclosure responsibili-
ties when they use algorithms to identify, investigate, and prosecute a suspect. 
This Part discusses the constitutional tension between intellectual property 
and a defendant’s due process rights and explains why the principles of Brady 
require that the latter, not the former, prevail. 
A. The Brady Doctrine: Human Witnesses and Their Algorithmic 
Counterparts 
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor cannot 
withhold evidence “favorable to an accused” because such suppression vio-
lates the defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.117 The Brady doctrine thus imposes upon prosecutors a duty to 
learn of and disclose to the defendant any information in their possession that 
is “favorable” and “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”118 
The Brady doctrine represents a limited and necessary departure from the 
pure adversarial model of the United States legal system.119 Such a departure 
is warranted because the prosecutor represents not an ordinary party but a 
sovereignty; as such, the prosecutor’s purpose is “not that it shall win a case, 
but that justice shall be done.”120 The Supreme Court created this duty to dis-
close because “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when 
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when 
any accused is treated unfairly.”121 Ultimately, the Brady requirement is a “rule 
of fairness”—an essential tenet of our criminal justice system.122 The Brady 
 
 117. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 118. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“[T]he indi-
vidual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 
the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”). 
 119. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (“By requiring the prosecutor to 
assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a pure 
adversary model.”) 
 120. Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). 
 121. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 122. Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Curry v. United States, 
658 A.2d 193, 197 (D.C. 1995)). 
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doctrine also serves to safeguard against the inherent power asymmetry be-
tween the state and defendant, helping to equalize an otherwise deeply skewed 
system.123 
1. The Rise of Trade Secrecy in Policing 
Despite the necessity of the Brady requirement for a fair criminal system, 
trade secret protections directly clash with, and pose a threat to, the constitu-
tional defenses erected by Brady. While research in this area is limited by bar-
riers to access,124 researchers have been able to identify flaws in proprietary 
algorithms. These flaws, discussed in Part I, are pervasive in law enforcement 
algorithmic tools. For example, law enforcement algorithms have been found 
to be systematically biased based on race and gender due to the use of data 
skewed by past discriminatory police practices in algorithm development.125 
Because the systems are built and trained upon biased data, they allow police 
departments to recast past discriminatory practices as infallible new technol-
ogy, thereby deepening and perpetuating those discriminatory practices.126 
Law enforcement algorithms can also have mistakes in their source code: even 
 
 123. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second 
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 757 (2007). 
 124. Trade secrecy and other forms of intellectual property protection are one such barrier. 
For example, police departments have denied researchers’ requests for even the user manuals for 
their facial recognition tools, citing trade secret exemptions. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1367. 
Trade secret protections are an especially difficult barrier for researchers since trade secrets are 
also exempt from federal and state open-records laws, which researchers often rely on to obtain 
records from public entities. Id. at 1366, 1367 n.113; see Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552b(c)(4). Other barriers include efforts by law enforcement to conceal their deployment of 
new technologies, Joh, supra note 95, at 29 (describing how two police departments shielded 
their use of stingray devices (cell-site simulators) for nearly a decade by calling the devices “con-
fidential informants”); other privileges raised to prevent disclosure, such as the “law enforce-
ment privilege,” see, e.g., Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 64 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing 
how the law enforcement privilege intends to prevent interference with law enforcement inves-
tigations, techniques, and protocols); efforts by proprietors to keep their government contracts 
a secret, April Glaser, Thousands of Contracts Highlight Quiet Ties Between Big Tech and U.S. 
Military, NBC (July 8, 2020, 4:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/thousands-
contracts-highlight-quiet-ties-between-big-tech-u-s-n1233171 [perma.cc/P9VR-VXR9]; and 
logistical hurdles raised by the complicated nature of algorithms, Rob Kitchin, Thinking Criti-
cally About and Researching Algorithms, 20 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 14, 20–21 (2017) (explain-
ing why algorithms’ “heterogeneous and embedded” nature makes them difficult to fully 
deconstruct and understand). 
 125. Tom Simonite, The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces Equally, WIRED 
(July 22, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-recognize-
black-faces-equally [perma.cc/F5D4-KTLH]; Rich, supra note 19, at 909, 922 n.357; see also Sahil 
Chinoy, Opinion, The Racist History Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/facial-recognition-race.html [perma.cc/68YD-
WZH5]; Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 34. 
 126. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 40–46; Karen Hao, Police Across the US Are Training 
Crime-Predicting AIs on Falsified Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.technolo-
gyreview.com/2019/02/13/137444/predictive-policing-algorithms-ai-crime-dirty-data 
[perma.cc/HC9Y-J977]. 
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an error as simple as a misplaced ampersand can significantly alter the algo-
rithm’s operation.127 Despite mounting evidence of their fallibility, police de-
partments across the country continue to acquire and implement proprietary 
algorithmic tools—often in secret.128 
Prosecutors and proprietors are already resisting disclosure of infor-
mation pertaining to law enforcement algorithms in criminal cases. For ex-
ample, the New York Police Department (NYPD) used facial recognition 
technology to find a man who stole a pair of socks in a department store using 
an image from the store’s surveillance camera.129 Multiple potential matches 
were generated.130 From those matches, the NYPD detective selected a photo 
of Andre131 and texted an officer who had witnessed the incident, “Is this the 
guy?”132 The officer texted back in the affirmative. Andre’s attorneys argued 
that the single photograph and text-message confirmation was the “sole basis” 
for the arrest. When Andre tried to obtain information about NYPD’s use of 
the facial recognition program, NYPD and prosecutors resisted, claiming that 
disclosure would violate the trade secrecy of the program’s owner, a third-party 
vendor. Before the disclosure issue was resolved, Andre took a plea deal.133 
Had the other suspect matches come from a human eyewitness rather 
than from a facial recognition program, the prosecutors would not have been 
able to shield the eyewitness from scrutiny.134 Brady would have required the 
prosecutors to disclose that the eyewitness had identified multiple possible 
 
 127. See Chessman, supra note 54, at 187; Wexler, supra note 62, at 1368. 
 128. See Mick Dumke & Frank Main, A Look Inside the Watch List Chicago Police Fought 
to Keep Secret, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 18, 2017, 9:26 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017
/5/18/18386116/a-look-inside-the-watch-list-chicago-police-fought-to-keep-secret [perma.cc
/E8VF-AAY9]; JAKE LAPERRUQUE, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, FACING THE FUTURE OF 
SURVEILLANCE (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/docs.pogo.org/report/2019/Facing-the-Fu-
ture-of-Surveillance_2019.pdf [perma.cc/K6PM-6JUN]. 
 129. Mike Hayes, “Is This the Guy?,” APPEAL (Aug. 20, 2019), https://theappeal.org/is-this-
the-guy [perma.cc/CX6S-4VJX]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. “Andre” is the pseudonym The Appeal gave the defendant at his attorneys’ behest. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. E.g., People v. Robinson, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1995) (“When exculpa-
tory evidence involves an eyewitness to the crime, what must be disclosed is not just the witness’s 
identity ‘but all pertinent information which might assist the defense to locate him.’ ” (quoting 
Eleazer v. Superior Ct., 464 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1970))). 
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suspects other than the defendant,135 as well as the eyewitness’s level of cer-
tainty (or uncertainty) about each identification.136 This would be true even if 
the eyewitness’s testimony were not introduced by the prosecutor at trial and 
only the witnessing police officer were to testify.137 That the prosecutor de-
clined to use the eyewitness at trial does not negate the Brady value of the 
eyewitness’s uncertainty or unreliability. Further, had the prosecutor intro-
duced the eyewitness at trial (or had the testifying police officer improperly or 
sloppily relied on such an unreliable investigative lead, as seems likely in An-
dre’s case),138 the prosecutor would be required to disclose information chal-
lenging the credibility of the eyewitness—including evidence that the witness 
was racially biased139 or had previously given inconsistent statements.140 Thus, 
had the NYPD relied on a human eyewitness in its investigation, Brady would 
have afforded Andre the evidence he needed to present a full defense. But 
since the NYPD relied on a proprietary tool and could therefore invoke trade 
secrecy, Andre was denied that same evidence.141 
 
 135. See Carrillo v. County of Los Angeles, 798 F.3d 1210, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2015) (allow-
ing suit for Brady violation to proceed because the officer failed to disclose, among other things, 
that the eyewitness had selected several other photos before identifying the defendant’s photo 
from a line-up). 
 136. See, e.g., Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a witness’s 
statement about uncertainty of her identification of defendant was “classic Brady material”); Ja-
cobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1287–89 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding a Brady violation when the 
state withheld a polygraph report about an eyewitness’s lack of certainty about what he saw). 
 137. Police departments often defend their use of law enforcement algorithms by stating 
that such tools merely provide investigative leads and are not used at trial. Compare Hayes, supra 
note 129 (“Like eye-witness testimony, . . . a facial recognition match serves as one piece of a 
larger investigation. It is a lead, not probable cause . . . .”), with Garvie, supra note 27 (“[T]he 
reality is that suspects are being apprehended almost entirely on the basis of face recognition 
[matches].”). 
 138. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 n.15 (1995) (emphasizing that jurors must be 
able to weigh “the sloppiness of the investigation against the probative force of the State’s evi-
dence”); see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986) (“A common trial tactic 
of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the 
defendant, and we may consider such use in assessing a possible Brady violation.”). 
 139. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 956 A.2d 375, 380 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (em-
phasizing that “there is no room for racial bias in any law enforcement investigation” and re-
quiring prosecutor to turn over information relating to officer’s racial animus and use of racial 
epithet in referring to defendant under Brady); Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1996) (stating that “[r]acial prejudice is a prototypical form of bias” and thus must be dis-
closed as impeachment evidence under Texas criminal-procedure rules); cf. United States v. Jer-
nigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that since cross-racial eyewitness 
identifications are already “particularly suspect,” suppression of evidence calling those identifi-
cations into question was a Brady violation). 
 140. See White v. Helling, 194 F.3d 937, 943–46 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a Brady violation 
where prosecutor failed to disclose that its key eyewitness had originally identified another indi-
vidual and only identified the defendant after meetings with the police). 
 141. Another defendant who was denied access to algorithmic information is Billy Ray 
Johnson. Johnson was convicted of twenty-four crimes based on DNA evidence generated by 
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Cases like Andre’s illustrate the costs of weakening Brady protections in 
the face of new law enforcement technology.142 The costs will continue to 
mount as trade secret protections are increasingly raised by prosecutors and 
faced by defendants.143 
Technological advances will also accelerate the rate of trade secret invo-
cations in criminal proceedings. Law enforcement algorithm tools, the com-
ponents of which can be claimed as trade secrets,144 are proliferating.145 These 
tools are being marketed as a cost-effective investigation solution to law en-
forcement agencies, who are among the biggest consumers of algorithmic 
technologies like facial recognition programs.146 Thus, trade secret protections 
are likely to be increasingly invoked against defendants’ requests for law en-
forcement algorithmic information. 
As more proprietary tools are adopted by law enforcement, more criminal 
defendants will need—and more proprietors will resist—access to algorithmic 
systems. Indeed, a similar trend can be traced with tools that have had more 
time to be challenged in courts.147 For example, the use of probabilistic DNA 
 
TrueAllele, a proprietary probabilistic DNA genotyping tool. Before and during his trial, John-
son requested access to the tool’s source code. The trial court denied Johnson access under Cal-
ifornia’s codified trade secret privilege. Johnson was sentenced to life in prison without parole. 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal recognized that Johnson and amici had made a 
“strong showing” that TrueAllele produced inconsistent results but declined to evaluate the trial 
court’s denial because “any error was harmless.” People v. Johnson, No. F071640, 2019 WL 
3025299, at *1, *8, *10 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2019). 
 142. See Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. 2006). 
 143. See Hayes, supra note 129; RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M. 
SOUTHERLAND, AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW CHALLENGES 
TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 17 (2019), https://ainowinsti-
tute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf [perma.cc/DNR2-Q5C9] (explaining that a “common 
justification[] for nondisclosure” of algorithmic information is that “trade secrecy protections 
limit[] disclosure”); see also Wexler, supra note 62, at 1360 (discussing a trade-secret-privilege 
case “now being cited in criminal proceedings across the country to justify withholding trade 
secret evidence from the accused”). 
 144. See supra Part I. 
 145. See, e.g., supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text; RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 
143, at 17; Harwell, supra note 116 (reporting that the largest seller of police body cameras—
now used by most major-city police departments—is developing facial recognition analysis for 
live body-camera footage, which may “lead to police misidentifying innocent people as suspects 
or wanted criminals”). 
 146. See Facial Recognition: Top 7 Trends, THALES, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/mar-
kets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/facial-recognition [perma.cc/8Q43-
J5VZ] (last updated June 6, 2021) (“The two most significant drivers of this growth are surveil-
lance in the public sector and numerous other applications in diverse market segments.”); Julia 
Horowitz, Tech Companies Are Still Helping Police Scan Your Face, CNN BUS. (July 3, 2020, 8:36 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/03/tech/facial-recognition-police/index.html [perma.cc
/4T35-HC75]. 
 147. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU & ACLU of S. Cal. in Support of Defendant–
Appellant Seeking Reversal at 41, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2019), 
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genotyping programs has rapidly expanded in the last ten years.148 Defendants 
across the country have requested access to those programs used against them; 
proprietors have routinely resisted disclosure, citing trade secrecy and com-
mercial concerns.149 Courts have consistently denied defendants’ access re-
quests.150 
2. The Need to Treat Algorithmic and Human Sources Alike 
That algorithmic information enjoys heightened protection as a trade se-
cret is perplexing given that a defendant’s due process rights remain the same 
regardless of the source of evidence against them—whether that source is dig-
ital or human. Developers argue that the disclosure of trade secrets to criminal 
defendants would jeopardize innovation in criminal justice technology.151 
However, while those innovation concerns have merit,152 procedural mecha-
nisms like protective orders can ensure that trade secrets remain shielded 
 
2017 WL 10320829, at *41 [hereinafter Johnson ACLU Amicus Brief] (contending that the gov-
ernment’s interest in secrecy of DNA testing software TrueAllele’s source code is “derivative of 
a private company’s intellectual-property interest in purported trade-secrets information”). 
 148. STRmix, one brand of probabilistic DNA genotyping program, was first introduced 
in 2012. By 2020, STRmix had been used in over 65,000 investigations in North America and 
provided evidence in more than 1,300 cases. Arguing the Case for Probabilistic Genotyping, ISHI 
(July 9, 2020), https://www.ishinews.com/arguing-the-case-for-probabilistic-genotyping 
[perma.cc/M3YY-SLLP]; see also Survey Shows STRmix Has Been Used in 220,000 Cases World-
wide, STRMIX (Nov. 19, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.strmix.com/news/survey-shows-strmix-
has-been-used-in-220000-cases-worldwide [perma.cc/8P3N-99HY]. 
 149. Illustrative of proprietors’ insistence on trade secrecy, Cybergenetics warns on its 
website that “los[ing] trade secret protection” would “abolish[] software that finds truth” and 
that defense “[l]awyers could destroy innovative companies and put them out of business.” The 
Government Wants to Take Away Your Right to Use Independent Forensic Software, 
CYBERGENETICS (June 23, 2020), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2020/jun
/Government-wants-to-take-away-your-right-to-use-independent-forensic-software.shtml 
[perma.cc/T4VH-6N3R]; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Feb. 4, 2016), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Michael_Robin-
son_Opinion.pdf [perma.cc/M5BW-ZVZZ] (barring defendant access because of the “potential 
to cause great harm to Cybergenetics”); Brief of Appellant at 25, State v. Simmer, 935 N.W.2d 
167 (Neb. 2019) (No. S-18-000500) (noting that Cybergenetics’ founder resisted disclosing 
source code because it was a trade secret, though he had a change of heart at the “eleventh hour”). 
 150. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing Controversy 
over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 101 (2016); 
Michelle Taylor, Bill Questions Proprietary Algorithms Used in Probabilistic Genotyping Soft-
ware, FORENSIC MAG. (July 27, 2020), https://www.forensicmag.com/566619-Bill-Questions-
Proprietary-Algorithms-Used-in-Probabilistic-Genotyping-Software [perma.cc/XKZ2-X77V] 
(stating that Cybergenetics “has yet to lose” when invoking trade secrecy in cases in which 
TrueAllele’s findings were submitted as evidence). 
 151. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (expressing 
concern that “it would not be possible to market [the software] if it were available for free”). 
 152. See Wexler, supra note 62, at 1421–22. 
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from the public while still allowing access by the defendant.153 In fact, protec-
tive orders are routinely granted to shield proprietary technology in civil pro-
ceedings, showing that such orders are effective.154 And there are other ways 
to incentivize innovation of law enforcement algorithms: alternate forms of 
intellectual property, such as patents; exclusive government contracts contin-
gent on transparency; tax incentives; and prize competitions.155 Ultimately, 
the stakes for criminal defendants are far too great to prioritize intellectual 
property concerns at the expense of constitutional protections. As shown in 
the remainder of this Section, barring defendant access to algorithmic infor-
mation on the basis of trade secret protections is in tension with the Brady 
doctrine. Differentiation between algorithmic and nonalgorithmic material is 
unwarranted in light of the principles and rationale underlying Brady and its 
progeny. 
Defendants’ inability to access favorable information156 about law en-
forcement algorithms is detrimental to due process for the same reasons that 
defendants’ inability to access that information about nonalgorithmic sources 
is detrimental. For example, courts have held that an eyewitness’s inconsistent 
descriptions of the perpetrator must be disclosed under Brady.157 Similarly, 
algorithms used in criminal proceedings produce inconsistent results, even 
when conducted by the same program.158 Courts have also required disclosure 
of information that links someone other than the defendant to the crime, as 
 
 153. Protection orders, while one solution to due-process concerns, do not alleviate the 
tension between trade secret protections and the First Amendment or the right to access criminal 
trials. Those constitutional tensions, however, are not within the scope of this Note. 
 154. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 n.24 (1979) 
(“[O]rders forbidding any disclosure of trade secrets or confidential commercial information are 
rare [in the civil context]. More commonly, the trial court will enter a protective order restricting 
disclosure to counsel.”). However, overly protective orders that essentially render defense access 
to the algorithm meaningless raise the same Brady concerns; courts should thus be cautious in 
crafting protective orders. See Lydia Pallas Loren & Andy Johnson-Laird, Computer Software-
Related Litigation: Discovery and the Overly-Protective Order, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 75, 115–23 
(2012) (criticizing protective orders with proprietor-imposed conditions like “only handwritten 
notes” or no “compiling the source code” for rendering any review ineffective and extremely 
burdensome). 
 155. Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 714–24 (2018); 
Wexler, supra note 62, at 1423. 
 156. Information favorable to the defendant includes both exculpatory and impeachment 
evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972)). 
 157. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–44, 45 (1995) (finding a Brady violation because 
prosecution failed to disclose multiple inconsistent statements by key witness); see also Macka-
bee v. United States, 29 A.3d 952, 956–59 (D.C. 2011) (acknowledging that inconsistent descrip-
tions were exculpatory). 
 158. Johnson ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 147, at 14 (stating that DNA genotyping sys-
tem TrueAllele gave four significantly different likelihood ratios for one defendant). 
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when a witness identifies different suspects.159 Like in Willie Lynch’s case, fa-
cial recognition programs can also produce multiple suspects other than the 
defendant.160 
Courts also emphasize that the prosecution must disclose any infor-
mation relating to potential witness bias pursuant to Brady. This includes 
whether the witness received any benefits (such as monetary or sentence-re-
duction benefits)161 or whether the witness has shown animosity towards the 
defendant’s race or other characteristics.162 Likewise, the proprietors who con-
tract algorithmic systems to law enforcement agencies have financial incen-
tives to meet law enforcement expectations that the tools they pay for will help 
maximize the number of successful prosecutions. Thus, proprietor incentives 
to design overbroad tools (or to ignore errors that create overbreadth)163 pose 
the same risk to algorithms’ credibility that human witnesses’ incentives pose. 
Law enforcement algorithms have also been shown to produce racially biased 
and gendered results.164 It is important for defendants to understand how eye-
witness identifications were made because unconscious racial and gender bias 
may have influenced eyewitnesses’ recollections, and police officers’ own ra-
cial, gender, and confirmation biases may have led them to overly rely on bi-
ased eyewitnesses’ leads. The same is true for law enforcement algorithms. 
These parallels show that algorithmic information has the same underly-
ing flaws as human witnesses or statements that raise due process concerns 
and must likewise be subject to Brady. As this Section has shown, analogizing 
algorithmic systems to human witnesses—particularly in the Brady context—
is an apt conceptual framework. Indeed, practitioners and scholars have com-
pared algorithmic systems to their human counterparts in a variety of con-
texts. One scholar, likening algorithmic systems’ outputs to “machine 
testimony,” argues that defendants should be able to cross-examine machine 
witnesses under the Confrontation Clause.165 
 
 159. E.g., Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 389, 391 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a Brady viola-
tion because prosecution failed to disclose “positive identification of different suspects by an 
eyewitness to the crime”). 
 160. See supra notes 69–78 and accompanying text. 
 161. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698, 702–03 (2004) (finding a Brady violation when 
prosecution failed to disclose that the witness was a paid informant); Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (finding a Brady violation when prosecution failed to disclose nonprose-
cution agreement with witness). 
 162. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 956 A.2d 375, 379–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
 163. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. 
L. REV. 327, 398–400 (2015) (arguing that surveillance technology companies have little incen-
tive to fix errors in their programs); Jeanna Neefe Matthews et al., When Trusted Black Boxes 
Don’t Agree: Incentivizing Iterative Improvement and Accountability in Critical Software Systems, 
2020 PROC. AAAI/ACM CONF. ON AI ETHICS & SOC’Y 102 (describing how proprietors might 
“avoid costly debugging” by using intellectual property claims to keep knowledge about errors 
unknown); Stephanie J. Lacambra, Jeanna Matthews & Kit Walsh, Opening the Black Box: De-
fendants’ Rights to Confront Forensic Software, CHAMPION, May 2018, at 28, 28, 38. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36. 
 165. Roth, supra note 3, at 2039–48. 
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If courts allow prosecutors to invoke trade secret protections for law en-
forcement algorithms in criminal proceedings, the constitutional safeguards 
promised by Brady will be undermined. This Brady carveout could incentivize 
law enforcement and prosecutors to increasingly exploit algorithmic tools to 
circumvent the duty to investigate and disclose favorable material. Allowing 
such leeway will not only diminish defendants’ due process protections but 
also cause expressive harm by signaling that the innovation incentives of trade 
secret protections outweigh defendants’ constitutional rights.166 The choice to 
protect a proprietor’s intellectual property right at the expense of a defend-
ant’s due process right conveys to defendants and the broader public that their 
government values commercial interests over the accused’s interest in a full 
and fair trial.167 That message of inferiority, in addition to inflicting psycho-
logical trauma on the specific defendant,168 in and of itself creates expressive 
harm by indicating disregard for defendants and by forcing them into a dis-
valued relationship with their government.169 
B. Additional Forms of Resistance to Brady Disclosure of Algorithmic 
Systems 
Despite the similarities between human and algorithmic witnesses, the 
latter have proven particularly resistant to Brady disclosure. In addition to the 
trade secret privilege discussed above, resistance generally comes in two other 
forms: (1) that the algorithm is not “in possession” of the prosecutor and (2) 
that the algorithm is not “material.”170 While resistance through trade secrets 
is the primary focus of this Note, these additional two challenges are worth 
discussing here because they are often raised in conjunction with or as alter-
natives to the trade secret privilege.171 As a result, courts sometimes are not 
clear whether or to what extent their rulings are based on trade secret grounds 
 
 166. Expressive harm, while difficult to capture in one definition, id. at 494, generally exists 
where a person is “treated according to principles that express negative or inappropriate atti-
tudes toward her.” See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (2000). 
 167. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 166, at 1542–44 (explaining how discriminatory 
laws inflict expressive harm by branding the discriminated individuals as inferior and that such 
“legal communications of status inferiority constitute their targets as second-class citizens”); see 
also Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1533, 1536 
(2017) (showing how state privacy intrusions, i.e., departures from the baseline privacy protec-
tions afforded to individuals, signal the government’s disrespect to the harmed and signals to 
the public that the harmed “lacks social standing and regard relative to other groups and insti-
tutions in society”). 
 168. See Alan Strudler, The Power of Expressive Theories of Law, 60 MD. L. REV. 492, 492–
93 (2001) (describing the difference between “expressive harm” and “consequentialist harm” like 
psychological trauma). 
 169. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 166, at 1527–29. 
 170. See People v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 171. See id. 
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or on more traditional Brady grounds.172 This issue is exacerbated by the rel-
ative newness of the trade secret privilege.173 
1. Prosecutor’s Knowledge or Possession 
Prosecutors may argue that an algorithm is not Brady material because it 
is not in the prosecutor’s “know[ledge]” or “possession,”174 but rather pos-
sessed by a third-party proprietor.175 However, this element of Brady is con-
strued permissively—constructive knowledge or possession is sufficient.176 
Information is constructively within the prosecutor’s knowledge or possession 
if the “prosecution team,” which includes “others acting on the government’s 
behalf,”177 knows or possesses it.178 In other words, even if the prosecutor does 
not actually know or possess the exculpatory information, knowledge or pos-
session is imputed to the prosecutor if any entity assisting them does know or 
possess it.179 
Courts have imputed information known or possessed by law enforce-
ment witnesses and investigators,180 crime labs,181 crime lab technicians,182 
nurse examiners,183 and expert witnesses184 to prosecutors. While the law is 
quite unsettled as to the scope of the prosecution team,185 courts largely agree 
 
 172. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1393–94 (tracing the “wave” of criminal cases in the mid-
2000s in which defendants sought source code for breath test devices as well as courts’ rationales 
for denying defense access, including that the code was not in the prosecutor’s “possession” or 
that the code was not “relevant or material”); id. at 1360–61 (noting that though some courts 
have adopted an explicit trade secret privilege, others have instead “more loosely” incorporated 
trade secrecy as a consideration when evaluating defendants’ requests for access). 
 173. Id. at 1395 (citing People v. Superior Ct. (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at 
*6, *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015)) (stating that the first explicit application of a trade secret 
evidentiary privilege in a criminal case by any appeals court in the country was likely in 2015). 
 174. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 263 (1999). 
 175. See Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 76. 
 176. See, e.g., United States v. Linder, No. 12 CR 22, 2013 WL 812382, at *33 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
5, 2013) (noting that the prosecutor’s constructive knowledge or possession has been “broadly 
construed”). 
 177. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
 178. Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 179. In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 720 (Cal. 1998) (“[T]hose assisting the government’s case 
are . . . its agents. By necessary implication, the duty is nondelegable at least to the extent the 
prosecution remains responsible for any lapse in compliance.” (citations omitted)). 
 180. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438. 
 181. Bracamontes v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53, 64 (Ct. App. 2019). 
 182. Brown, 952 P.2d at 719. 
 183. McCormick v. Parker, 821 F.3d 1240, 1246–48 (10th Cir. 2016); People v. Uribe, 76 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 846–47 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 184. State v. Farris, 656 S.E.2d 121, 126 (W. Va. 2007); see also Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 63 (discussing Farris). 
 185. See United States v. Rosenschein, No. 16-4571, 2019 WL 2298810, at *5 (D.N.M. May 
30, 2019) (“Unfortunately, there are few cases in which the Tenth Circuit has analyzed whether 
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that whether a witness or source “constitutes a state actor for purposes of 
Brady” requires an inquiry into “what the person did, not who the person 
is.”186 Thus, even if the entity is privately owned or employed, the function 
served by the entity remains the primary focus.187 
For example, in Bracamontes v. Superior Court, a California state court 
held that two private forensic labs were part of the prosecution team for Brady 
purposes because the lab had “assisted in the government’s investigation” by 
conducting DNA testing “in an effort to identify or exclude suspects.”188 The 
court emphasized that the lab received monetary payment from the govern-
ment for its services.189 Further, the court expressly disagreed with the prose-
cutor’s attempt to distinguish between private and government-run crime 
labs. In “both cases,” the work was “conducted on behalf of the government.” 
The private labs thus bore “the same relationship to the prosecution” as gov-
ernment labs, making it “reasonable to impute the private party’s knowledge 
to the prosecution.”190 Similarly, in State v. Farris, the West Virginia Supreme 
Court held that a private, out-of-state forensic psychologist was part of the pros-
ecution team because the psychologist had conducted her examinations “at the 
request” of the prosecutor’s investigation team.191 Thus, the knowledge she ob-
tained was imputed to the prosecutors.192 
Algorithmic systems should likewise be evaluated based on what they do, 
not who their proprietors are.193 If the algorithmic system directly assists in 
the investigation of a specific case, it is, like its human counterparts, “acting 
on the government’s behalf.” For example, an algorithmic system that exam-
ines DNA evidence “in an effort to identify or exclude suspects”194 is part of 
the prosecution team even if the system is privately owned, just like the lab in 
 
a person or entity is part of the prosecution team. . . . Outside the Tenth Circuit, there are few 
cases that have set forth a framework for analyzing who is part of the prosecution team.”). 
 186. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006); State v. Mullen, 
259 P.3d 158, 169 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (citing Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th 
Cir. 2009)). 
 187. Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64 (private crime labs); McCormick, 821 F.3d at 
1246–48 (nurse examiner at a privately owned hospital); Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846–47 (same). 
 188. Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 64–65. 
 191. State v. Farris, 656 S.E.2d 121, 126 (W. Va. 2007); see also Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 63 (discussing Farris). 
 192. Farris, 656 S.E.2d at 126. 
 193. This analogy is further bolstered by the fact that some proprietary algorithms are de-
veloped and owned by the government itself. E.g., Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New 
York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA Evidence (Oct. 20, 2017, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-york-crime-labs-software-for-
analyzing-dna-evidence [perma.cc/Q4CX-CM6J] (describing New York City’s discontinued 
probabilistic DNA genotyping tool). 
 194. Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64. 
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Bracamontes.195 A predictive system used to determine the scope of a criminal 
conspiracy that examines a party “at the request” of investigators and provides 
an “expert opinion,” as the forensic psychologist did in Farris, is part of the 
prosecution team.196 A facial recognition system that searches and identifies a 
primary suspect is part of the prosecution team because it not only assists but 
“effectively commence[s] the prosecution of th[e] case.”197 On the other hand, 
systems that are not directly “involved in the investigation of the case”198 or 
are used merely at trial for “perceptual content,”199 as with content used to 
prove a physical fact rather than the truth of the substance contained within,200 
may be less likely to constitute part of the prosecution team. But law enforce-
ment algorithms deployed to assist in a specific criminal investigation should 
largely be considered as “acting on the government’s behalf.” Ultimately, a 
“case-by-case analysis” is required, algorithmic source or not.201 
Like the forensic psychologist in Farris and the crime labs in Bracamontes, 
both of which were private entities, that an algorithmic system is owned by a 
private company should not obviate the necessary inquiry into the algorithm’s 
role in the investigation. This extension makes sense for two related reasons. 
First, the underlying question of the “knowledge or possession” requirement 
is “whether the [g]overnment should be held responsible for the actions” of 
the entity.202 When the government has affirmatively “instructed” or “con-
tracted” the entity to conduct an investigative task, it is reasonable that the 
government be held responsible, at least as to the scope of its request.203 Sec-
 
 195. Cf. People v. Wakefield, 107 N.Y.S.3d 487, 496–97 (App. Div. 2019) (“[A]lthough 
[DNA tool proprietor] Cybergenetics is independent from law enforcement, at the time the 
[DNA] report was generated, Cybergenetics was ‘acting in the role of assisting the police and 
prosecutors in developing evidence for use at trial.’ ” (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 59 N.Y.S.3d 
337, 345 (App. Div. 2017))). 
 196. Farris, 656 S.E.2d at 126. 
 197. United States v. Rosenschein, No. 16-4571, 2019 WL 2298810, at *6–7 (D.N.M. May 
30, 2019) (holding that a government agency, even if it merely “forwarded [the defendant’s lo-
cation] to law enforcement,” was still part of the prosecution team because it was “involved in 
the investigation of the case[] and has provided information to the government in aid of the 
prosecution” (emphasis omitted)). 
 198. Id. at *7 (emphasis omitted). 
 199. Roth, supra note 3, at 2005 (describing how FBI malware outputs would be probative 
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ond, a permissive “knowledge or possession” requirement ensures that pros-
ecutors do not have a perverse incentive to shield themselves from Brady ma-
terial.204 Otherwise, Brady protections “might be nullified simply by keeping 
the prosecutor ignorant of information adverse to the government’s case.”205 
Likewise, Brady protections would be rendered toothless if prosecutors could 
avoid Brady obligations by outsourcing investigative tasks to privately owned 
algorithms. Indeed, many scholars have lamented this as a crucial problem of 
privatizing state functions—a problem that is growing.206 Opaque privatiza-
tion risks “corporate capture” and the unaccountable exercise of public 
power.207 Thus, when the government decides to contract with the proprietor 
of a law enforcement algorithm for use in a public, investigatory function, the 
algorithm should be considered within the knowledge or possession of the 
prosecutor. 
2. Material Either to Guilt or to Punishment 
The materiality requirement—or its manipulation—may pose another 
hurdle to defendants’ access to algorithmic information under Brady. Prose-
cutors are only obliged to disclose evidence “material either to guilt or to pun-
ishment” to the defendant.208 Materiality thus serves two purposes. Before 
trial, it is the threshold that instructs prosecutors on whether evidence must 
be disclosed (material) or need not be disclosed (not material).209 After trial, 
it imposes on the defendant a requirement to prove harm, that is, to show that 
there was a reasonable probability that the withheld evidence would have 
changed the outcome of the trial had it been disclosed.210 Thus, “materiality” 
may be defined differently before and after trial, which may affect the defend-
ant’s ability to access algorithmic information under Brady. While the post-trial 
definition is firmly established, the pretrial standard is not. 
After trial, the standard for materiality imposes a prejudice require-
ment—the disclosure must have created a “reasonable probability” of a differ-
ent verdict.211 Appellate judges should assess the trial record as a whole,212 
including trial transcripts, to decide whether the disclosure would have 
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changed the outcome.213 However, appellate courts are hesitant to provide the 
extraordinary post-trial remedy of overturning convictions based on a Brady 
challenge.214 
The pretrial standard, in contrast to the established post-trial standard, is 
contested.215 The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the pretrial stand-
ard is the same as the post-trial one.216 Prosecutors, erroneously citing that 
dicta as though it were binding precedent, may assert that they do not have a 
pretrial or at-trial duty to disclose favorable evidence unless they determine 
that there is a “reasonable probability” the evidence would change the out-
come of the trial.217 However, this lack of differentiation between pretrial and 
post-trial standards has been widely critiqued.218 Scholars lament that such a 
pretrial standard is “literally impossible” to implement because “[f]rom the 
pretrial perspective, it is absurd to ask a prosecutor to determine anything 
about the outcome of a trial that has not yet occurred.”219 Drawing on the 
many unknowns of the future trial, prosecutors can “easily craft” some argu-
ment that disclosure of favorable information is unlikely to influence the trial 
outcome.220 This is particularly true with opaque and complex algorithms. 
Given the unworkability of the standard, many courts have waived the mate-
riality threshold, requiring the government to disclose all favorable infor-
mation in its possession.221 This is the prudent approach.222 Unfortunately, 
some courts continue to apply the prejudice standard before trial, which al-
lows prosecutors to “hid[e] behind the cloak of materiality” to shirk their 
Brady disclosure obligations at trial.223 It would be quite difficult, then, for a 
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defendant to overcome such a high, prosecutor-defined pretrial standard to 
obtain algorithmic evidence in time for trial. However, given the broad criti-
cism of a pretrial prejudice requirement and the courts’ warning that “argua-
ble cases” should err on the side of disclosure,224 algorithmic information 
should rarely be excluded before or at trial on the basis of a prosecutor-crafted 
assessment of materiality.225 
III. THE MISSING ALGORITHM INSTRUCTION: AN AT-TRIAL SAFEGUARD 
As shown in Part II, law enforcement algorithms are akin to human wit-
nesses in that they perform similar functions in criminal investigations and 
proceedings and raise similar issues related to credibility, reliability, and bias. 
This analogy to human witnesses is not entirely novel; it has been raised by 
practitioners and scholars226 and was acknowledged as “creative” by at least 
one court.227 This Part extends the analogy to justify a possible solution for 
situations in which the prosecutor or proprietor invokes a trade secret privi-
lege despite a defendant’s request for disclosure of the algorithmic information. 
Extending the analogy of algorithm as human witness, this Note proposes 
that courts adapt the “missing witness” evidentiary rule228 to “missing algo-
rithms.” This adapted rule would deploy a jury instruction for missing algo-
rithmic evidence to remedy conflicts between Brady’s constitutional mandate 
and trade secrecy. This remedy provides a due process safeguard at trial with-
out violating trade secrecy and without necessitating a solution as extraordi-
nary as excluding algorithmic evidence altogether229 or overturning230 a 
conviction on appeal. 
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A. The Missing Witness Instruction 
The “missing witness” rule refers to the permissible inference a jury may 
draw from the absence of a potential witness who might have knowledgeable 
facts at issue in the case.231 Take, for example, a defendant who is on trial for 
a robbery of a store. The prosecutor calls one eyewitness, the store manager, 
to testify before the jury. However, there were two eyewitnesses on the scene 
that saw the robbery occur—the store owner also witnessed the incident. The 
store owner, hostile to the robber, would be expected to testify favorably for 
the prosecution. But the prosecutor declines to call the store owner to the 
stand. The missing witness rule would allow the jury to infer that the prose-
cution refused to call the store owner because the owner’s testimony would 
have been unfavorable (perhaps, for example, the store owner’s description of 
the robber was inconsistent with the store manager’s).232 
The missing witness rule can be traced to the Supreme Court case Graves 
v. United States,233 and both the defense and prosecution are allowed to invoke 
it in criminal trials.234 There are two key prerequisites for a missing witness 
instruction: (1) the witness must have been “peculiarly” available to the op-
posing party (the witness is available to the prosecution but not reasonably 
accessible to the defense through other channels), and (2) the witness would 
have elucidated “noncumulative” information (the information is not already 
in the defense’s possession).235 One of the rationales236 underlying this rule is 
spoliation, the suppression of evidence by a party.237 The rule is intended to 
deter concealment of evidence and to encourage disclosure of all relevant ev-
idence.238 The reasoning is that when a party fails to produce a witness that 
knows facts about the case and the witness was “peculiarly available” to that 
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party but not the opposing party, the jury could “naturally” draw an adverse 
inference from that failure.239 The instruction is permissive, not mandatory—
juries are permitted to draw the inference but are not required to do so. If al-
lowed by the court, the inference is typically included in the closing argument 
to the jury and addressed by a jury instruction. 
B. The Missing Algorithm Instruction 
Similarly, a “missing algorithm” jury instruction would only be granted 
when two prerequisites are met: (1) the algorithmic system is peculiarly avail-
able to the prosecution, and (2) the algorithmic system would elucidate non-
cumulative information.240 In addition, because the instruction would only be 
a remedy for Brady material, the instruction would only be available for algo-
rithmic information that is “favorable” under Brady.241 
The missing algorithm instruction makes logical sense when trade secrecy 
is invoked to exclude an algorithm. In a criminal trial, the prosecution must 
prove each element of its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable 
doubt.242 When law enforcement substantially relies on an algorithm in its in-
vestigation or when the prosecution introduces an algorithm’s output at trial 
and examining the algorithm may reveal bias or unreliability or lack of credi-
bility, Brady requires that the defendant be given access to that impeachment 
material to help build their defense and persuade the jury that reasonable 
doubt exists.243 When Brady material is not disclosed, “irrespective of the good 
faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” a Brady “suppression” occurs.244 And 
“justice suffers” when such a suppression occurs—even when a third-party 
proprietor has commercial interests at stake.245 Thus, as with missing witness 
instructions, a jury should be permitted to draw a reasonable adverse infer-
ence from that suppression. 
The missing algorithm instruction is also reasonable because government 
entities wield significant market power. As the primary consumers of law en-
forcement technologies, government entities can choose which proprietors to 
work with and how to craft their contractual relationships to ensure greater 
transparency.246 For example, a government could condition its purchase of 
an algorithmic system on access to all documentation relating to the reliability 
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of the system. The government could also secure limited permission to dis-
close any Brady information contained therein to defendants under a protec-
tive order.247 In fact, some governmental entities already appear to be 
considering adjusting their contractual requirements to enhance algorithmic 
transparency.248 The availability of a missing algorithm instruction would in-
centivize more governmental entities to do so. 
Allowing the jury to draw an adverse inference from Brady suppression 
when the government raises a valid trade secret privilege may appear harsh, 
particularly since the trade secret holder is a private proprietor who is not a 
party in the criminal case. For example, the private proprietor might resist 
disclosure even when the prosecutor wishes to disclose. However, as discussed 
in Part II, it is reasonable—and arguably necessary in many cases—to treat the 
algorithmic system as acting on behalf of the government.249 A prosecutor, in 
their unique role as a representative of the government,250 cannot instruct a 
crime lab to help in its investigation or at trial, then shield the crime lab from 
adversarial scrutiny.251 Likewise, the prosecutor cannot have it both ways with 
algorithmic systems. The government should be thinking about its Brady du-
ties when it uses an algorithmic system to assist directly in an investigation or 
trial, and it should only work with proprietors that will allow the government 
to disclose the information it is constitutionally obliged to share with the de-
fense. If the government imprudently contracts with a proprietor that refuses 
to allow the required disclosures, the missing algorithm inference can remedy 
that due process failure at trial. 
Further, any harshness is mitigated by the prosecutor and proprietor’s vi-
able alternative—disclosing the algorithm under a protective order. Protective 
orders are issued routinely for trade secrets in the civil context.252 These orders 
even enable disclosure of a party’s trade secret to its direct competitor.253 Such 
routinely accepted safeguards in the civil context should likewise be sufficient 
to protect trade secrets in criminal trials.254 In light of the availability of pro-
tective orders, one scholar has suggested getting rid of the trade secret privi-
lege in the criminal context altogether.255 
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While removing the privilege from the criminal context altogether would 
promote transparency and accountability, trends suggest the use of trade se-
crets to prevent Brady disclosures is on the rise.256 Proprietors are aggressively 
and increasingly raising the privilege or asking governments to sign nondis-
closure agreements at the outset.257 And courts appear to be increasingly sym-
pathetic to trade secret arguments at each stage of a criminal case.258 In light 
of this trend, a missing algorithm instruction would provide a much-needed 
due process backstop. While the remedy does not provide the immediate 
transparency that full disclosure in all cases would, it provides longer-term 
incentives for the government to choose transparent practices and tools. This, 
in turn, would incentivize proprietors to develop transparent solutions.259 
Outside of protective orders, the remedies currently available to defend-
ants are either to request complete exclusion of the algorithmic evidence at 
trial or dismissal of the charges260 or to file a post-trial appeal seeking to over-
turn the conviction altogether. Neither is a satisfactory solution. The former 
risks providing the defendant with a windfall and punishing the prosecutor 
for raising a privilege.261 Further, the former would rarely provide defendants 
relief given how difficult it is for defendants to exclude evidence at trial suc-
cessfully.262 Nor would the former provide any relief for defendants deprived 
of Brady evidence not introduced at trial (like a facial recognition tool that 
provided many other possible suspects). The latter may force the defendant to 
 
 256. See id. at 1360 (first citing State v. Fair, No. 10-1-09274-5 SEA, slip op. at 3 n.1 (Wash. 
Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2017), ECR No. 383; then citing State’s Response to Def. Motion to Compel 
TrueAllele Source Code at 12–13, Fair, No. 10-1-09274-5 SEA, ECR No. 258; and then citing 
Letter Regarding Motion to Quash at 2, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 15, 2016)). 
 257. See Katyal, supra note 18, at 1262 (explaining how the City of San Francisco has 
“rarely fought language in contracts with third-party vendors that recognized that the algorithms 
must be kept from the public”); Joh, supra note 95, at 23–26. 
 258. For example, in People v. Johnson, the prosecution resisted disclosure of the TrueAl-
lele probabilistic DNA genotyping tool by raising a trade secret privilege. People v. Johnson, No. 
F071640, 2019 WL 3025229, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2019); see also People v. Superior Ct., 
239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2018). This is the case not just in the Brady context but in a 
wide variety of cases. See Katyal, supra note 18, at 1240 (discussing scholarship tracking how 
“nondisclosure privileges have grown, leading to trends that tend to favor commercial interests 
over public ones”). 
 259. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1220. 
 260. See Johnson EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 57, at 16. 
 261. Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 713, 717 (1999); see Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Vio-
lations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450, 1467–68 (2006). 
 262. To exclude evidence on the grounds that it would lead to unfair prejudice, a party 
must show that the evidence is “so inflammatory on its face” that it would divert the jury from 
material issues. United States v. Huyck, 849 F.3d 432, 440 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Jim Hilbert, 
The Disappointing History of Science in the Courtroom: Frye, Daubert, and the Ongoing Crisis of 
“Junk Science” in Criminal Trials, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 759, 762–63 (2019) (lamenting that courts’ 
failure to exclude even “junk science” in criminal cases has “undoubtedly resulted in wrongful 
convictions”). 
October 2021] Safeguarding Brady Against Trade Secrecy 191 
spend years in prison while the appeal is pending263 and requires the appellate 
court to conduct a difficult hindsight review of whether the admission of the 
evidence was prejudicial.264 
The missing algorithm instruction provides a more balanced alternative 
to those “extreme” solutions.265 It permits the jury, rather than requiring the 
judge, to balance the defendants’ access to algorithms and proprietors’ trade 
secrecy concerns. Allowing the jury to draw an inference in favor of the de-
fendant is not a punitive measure against the prosecutor;266 it is a due process 
safeguard, one that is appropriate given the prosecutor’s ability to allow access 
under a protective order as an alternative. 
A missing algorithm instruction might take the following form: 
In order for the defendant to receive a fair trial, the government is required 
to inform the defense of any information known to the government that casts 
doubt on the credibility of the government’s own evidence. In this case, the 
government failed to turn over promptly information favorable to the de-
fense, namely [algorithmic material], of which the defense learned only on 
[date], when [means of disclosure]. The government has declined to disclose 
this information because of trade secret (intellectual property) concerns. The 
government had the option to disclose the information under a protective 
order. Although this denial of access does not necessarily bear on the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant, you may, if you think it appropriate in light of 
all the evidence, take into account the possible harm to the defense caused 
by this denial when evaluating whether the government has proven the de-
fendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.267 
This instruction clearly conveys the government’s disclosure duty—and 
its breach of that duty—to the jury. But it also conveys the reason for that 
breach and asks the jury to consider any inferences in consideration of that 
fact. Additionally, the jury is instructed to consider “all the evidence.” That 
evidence would include any validation studies for the algorithm the prosecu-
tor may have produced at trial. Whether the jury would deem the validation 
studies sufficient would depend on whether the studies were independently 
conducted, the studies’ methodology, and other indicia of their credibility.268 
The missing algorithm instruction would therefore encourage prosecutors to 
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submit those studies at the outset and reward governmental entities that con-
tract with transparent and credible proprietors. Further, “all the evidence” 
means that an adverse inference would not be drawn when the prosecution 
has presented a strong case bolstered by other witnesses and evidence. In con-
trast, an adverse inference is more likely to be drawn when the algorithm pro-
vides the key or sole piece of evidence.269 
The instruction would be requested by the defense in a motion before or 
at trial. The timing would largely depend on when the suppression came to 
light. If requested at trial, the defense would make its request outside of the 
jury’s presence. Ultimately, the decision to grant this remedy would be within 
the trial court’s discretion. The trial court could also give more specific in-
structions and limit the defendant’s closing argument as to the scope of the 
adverse inference that can be drawn. 
Admittedly, a missing algorithm instruction is far from a cure-all. One 
significant situation in which this remedy would not be curative is when pros-
ecutors do not even disclose the use of law enforcement algorithms.270 Unfor-
tunately, this has happened in many cases in which a novel algorithm aided 
the investigation.271 As a result, most defendants do not know that an algorithm 
was involved in their investigation unless that information is serendipitously 
discovered.272 For example, Willie Lynch discovered that facial recognition 
technology was used to identify him only eight days before his trial.273 Many 
defendants never find out even after they are convicted.274 One striking exam-
ple: in Pinella County, Florida, law enforcement used facial recognition tech-
nology for fifteen years without ever providing the public defender’s office any 
indication of its use in Brady disclosures.275 Fortunately, organizations are be-
coming increasingly vigilant about law enforcement uses of algorithmic 
tools.276 And the availability of a missing-algorithm-instruction remedy may 
encourage more defense attorneys in pretrial discovery to learn whether an 
algorithm was used against their client. 
Another shortcoming of this remedy is that defendants will still have to 
satisfy the Brady hurdles of “knowledge or possession” and “materiality.” But 
as explained in Part II, the human-witness analogy—which highlights the 
common need for due process safeguards between algorithmic tools and hu-
man witnesses—helps show why law enforcement algorithms should in most 
cases clear these two hurdles. Defendants who can overcome these Brady pre-
requisites will be able to request the jury-instruction remedy at trial instead of 
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having to wait until an appeal. And courts are more likely to grant this less 
extreme remedy than to overturn a conviction entirely.277 
Critics of this remedy may raise two additional concerns. First, critics may 
argue that the defense will be able to “create” reasonable doubt among jurors 
by overinflating how favorable or material the algorithmic information is.278 
However, “[d]isclosure law cannot be predicated on the assumption that juries 
are [so] irrational” that a missing algorithm instruction would induce them to 
arbitrarily or capriciously discount the prosecution’s case.279 And the risk of cre-
ating reasonable doubt can be mitigated by a more tailored jury instruction.280 
Second, critics may argue that the traditional missing witness rule is dis-
favored in some jurisdictions and should be limited rather than extended. But 
courts’ concerns over this rule usually involve adverse inferences drawn 
against the defendant—not the prosecutor.281 Those concerns make sense 
given that defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and are not re-
quired to produce any evidence or any witnesses. Allowing the jury to draw 
an adverse inference against the defendant would risk shifting the burden of 
proof to the defendant. But law enforcement algorithms serve the prosecution 
team. The prosecutor bears the burden of convincing a jury that there is no 
reasonable doubt of guilt, and failing to produce the witness whose testimony 
was relied upon in the investigation or at trial may very well raise reasonable 
doubt. Therefore, the missing algorithm instruction would merely notify the 
jury that it should decide, in light of the other evidence presented, whether or 
not the prosecution team’s decision to disallow access and prevent the defend-
ant from testing the algorithm’s credibility is significant enough to raise doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
As privately developed law enforcement algorithms proliferate, due pro-
cess protections must keep pace. While algorithmic systems may be a cost-
effective solution for efficient investigations and prosecutions, “[s]ociety wins 
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair.”282 Yet 
trade secret evidentiary privileges are increasingly shielding algorithms from 
scrutiny. To ensure the continued fairness of the criminal justice system, a 
new due process safeguard is necessary. The missing algorithm instruction, an 
at-trial solution, may provide just that.
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